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he received the value and quality bargained for. The effect is alarming in the light
of present day merchandising methods. There was no deception because the seller's
fraud in allowing the prospective donee to pay a portion of the price prevented the coat
from being entirely a gift. The misrepresentation must refer to the subject matter of the
sale in order to justify recision for fraud. Collateral attitudes, and motives behind the
purchase, have no bearing on the materiality of the misrepresentation, as they are not
bargained for. The subject matter of the sale should not be expanded to include a status
the purchaser hoped it would assume. As pointed out by the dissent, the purchaser
wanted her to have the coat and the arrangement enabled her to get it at a price he
was willing to pay. Because she failed to live up to his expectations is no basis for
recision, and cannot be attributed to the seller. "Suitability," is no obstacle when it
appears that the coat is still servicable as a coat. In view of the donee's eagerness to
acquire the coat, it appears to be as suitable a subject of a gift as ever. The purchaser
only intended to give her a $4,000 gift, and had all gone well that is what she would
have received.
The error is in determining when one has suffered an injury. To allow one to
rescind a sale for fraud, the court should look to what was promised, and what was
received. If there is not a material disparity between the two, the recision should be
refused. The "materiality" with which we are concerned is limited to the value and the
quality of the subject matter of the sale. It is unfortunate when a rule so well established
is misapplied.
T. Marsh.

TRADE REGULATIONS: ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT-DEFENSE TO PRICE DiScRiMINATION.-Petitioner sold gasoline to certain customers at 1_9 cents per gallon less
than the prices charged other dealers for the same product in the same area.' This
reduction in price has reached the outlets of these customers, thus "injuring, destroying and preventing competition" between the favored dealers and the dealers purchasing
at the regular price. 2 Petitioner contended that its lower prices were made in good faith
to retain the favored individuals as customers. The prices were made to meet equally
lower prices of local competition, and in no case did the petitioner reduce prices below
that of his competitors. The commission treated evidence to this effect as irrelevant.
Held: Reversed and remanded. The facts offered by the petitioner constituted an absolute defense to the charge of price discrimination. (Five to three split; opinion by Mr.
Justice Burton.) Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1951), 41 F. T. C.
263; modified, 43 F. T. C. 56; modified, 173 F. 2d 210; reversed and remanded,
340 U. S. -

, 71 S. Ct. 240,95 L. Ed. -

.

The issue revolves on the determination of the meaning of the Clayton Act, section
2, as amended by section 2(a) and (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. They are as
follows:
"Sec. 2(a). That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce....
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities .

.

. where the

1

There was an attempt to show that this differential was due only to the lower cost of sale and

delivery to the favored customers. (Bulk sales, etc.) If proved this would bring the conduct under
section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, to the effect that nothing shall prohibit differential in
price, making only due allowance for differences in cost of distribution to these customers. (49 Stats.

1526, 15 U. S. C. sec. 13(a), 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13(a).) The defense was not sustained. (41 F. T. C.
263, 280.)
241 F. T. C. 263, 283.
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effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with
receives the benefit of such discrimination,
any person who either grants or knowingly
3

or with customers of either of them: .
. that there has been discrimination in price or
"(b) Upon proof being made
service or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made
by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section
and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to
issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the
services or facilities furnished by a competitor." (Emphasis added.) 49 Stats. 1526,
15 U. S. C. sec. 13(a) and (b), 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 13(a) and (b).

Unless, then 2(b) acts as an absolute defense the evidence offered by the petitioner
would be of no avail. Taking the language of 2(b) there is an ambiguity presented
which admits of two reasonable interpretations. The view adopted by the majority of
the court (with which this writer concurs) is that the prima-facie case referred to in
2(b) is made out by showing that the conduct has come within 2(a), which includes
the harmful affect on competition, and not by merely showing that there has been discrnination. Upon showing that the discrimination was in good faith to meet the equally
low price of a competitor the prima-facie case is rebutted, even though it may have had
a detrimental affect on competition. It follows that since the injurious result to competition was used in setting up the prima-facie case it can't again be used to overthrow
the rebuttal. Thus the language of 2(b) acts as an absolute defense. This is the
view adopted by the authorities, although generally there seems to have been a
lack of serious consideration of the problem. (Corn Products Refinng Co. v. Federal Trade Commssion (1945), 324 U. S. 726, 741, 65 S. Ct. 961, 968, 89 L. Ed.
1320, 1333, Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mig. Co. (1945),
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U. S. 746, 748, 753, 758, 65 S. Ct. 971, 972, 974, 976, 89 L. Ed. 1338, 1341, 1343, 1346;
Moss v. FederalTrade Commission (1945), 148 F. 2d 378, cert. denied 326 U. S. 734,
McWhrter v Monroe Calculating Machine Co (1948), 76 Fed. Supp. 456, 462 and
cases cited.
The other reasonable construction of section 2 is that the prima-facie case has
been made out by merely showing there has been price discrimination. This primafacie case may then be rebutted by showing the "lower price . . was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, . . ." It then becomes a separate

question of fact whether the "effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition." This is the view urged in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Reed.
There is merit in this contention, but to reach such a conclusion the two sections of
the statute must be read separate and apart. For if they are read together the "rebutting
[of] the prima-facie case thus made" seems, by context, to have reference to subsection
(a), which includes the effect on competition in setting up the prima-facie case. There
is no doubt under the language of the Clayton Act, section 2, before amended, that the
evidence offered by the petitioner, if supported, would constitute a good defense. It
reads as follows:
'2(a) does not require a finding as a fact that the discrmination has had an adverse affect on
the competition. It is sufficient for the application of this section that the discrimination "may" have
this affect. (Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1945), 324 U. S. 726, 738,
65 S. Ct. 961, 89 L. Ed. 1320; Cf. Standard Fashions Co. v. Margon-Houston Co. (1922), 258 U. S.
346, 42 S. Ct. 360, 66 L. Ed. 653 (same provision under the Clayton Act.) Thus the findings of the
commission bring the activity clearly vithin the meamng of the letter of 2(a).

